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RORTY'S MATERIALISM 
James Austin 
I. The Disappearance Form of the Identity Theory. 
Richard Rorty informs us that if we wish to inter-
pret his identity theory in terms of strict identity then 
the problems which are generated become insurmountable. 
Strict identity is characterized by a relation in which 
(x)(y)[(x=y)D(P)(Px2Py)]. 
Accordingly, we would be forced into the apparent absur-
dity of predicating brain-state properties of mental terms 
and vice versa. "Physical processes such as brain pheno-
mena..." would have to be able to be referred to as "dim 
or fading or nagging or false." Mental occurrences would 
then be publicly observable or physical or spatially 
located or swift."1 Of course, one could attempt to show 
that these seemingly absurd statements are not really 
absurd at all, that is, that they are not actually in-
stances of category-mistakes as they seem to be. Rorty 
calls this particular approach the "translation" form of 
the identity theory. 
The "translation" form has its own peculiar problems. It demands a "topic-neutral" language into which mind/brain expressions can be translated, thus avoiding category mis-takes. Suitable "topic-neutral" translations have failed to materialize, however, and the "strict identity" inter-pretation of the identity theory has been weakened propor-tionately. 
Rorty abandons the translation form and, with it, 
the strict identity interpretation. The kind of identity 
he has in mind is, in his words 
...not strict identity, but rather the sort of 
relation which obtains between...existent enti-
ties and non-existent entities when reference to 
^Delivered at the annual meeting of the Tennessee Philo-sophical Association at Vanderbilt University in the Fall. 1973. 
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the latter once served (some of) the purposes 
presently served by reference to the former— 
the sort of relation that holds, for example, 
between "quantity of caloric fluid" and "mean 
kinetic energy of molecules."2 
What used to be called "quantity of caloric fluid" is 
identical with what is now known as "mean kinetic energy 
of molecules." If Rorty is right, sensations are of the 
same type as caloric fluid; so, it is possible that we 
could one day say that what "used to" be referred to by 
'I am in pain' can now be referred to by 'MyC-fibers are 
firing.' And, as with caloric talk, mental talk (or sen-
sation-talk initially) would disappear. But more than 
that, the ontological status of sensation-talk would dis-
appear with it. Thus, Rorty names his position the "dis-
appearance form" of the identity theory. 
By this novel reinterpretation of 'identity* Rorty 
claimB both to avoid those problems inherent in the trans-
lation form and to remain faithful to the tenets of the 
identity theory. That is, the problems with topic-
neutrality are obviated but not at the expense of the 
materialistic doctrine itself. 
At the very outset, however, there seems to be a 
rather devastating criticism of Rorty's thesis, viz., that 
to eliminate 'sensation' is one thing, but to eliminate 
sensations themselves is quite another. Regardless of 
what one does with sensation talk, the independent reality 
of sensations will linger on. Excising the existence of 
the latter on the basis of the dispensability of the for-
mer is akin to throwing the baby out with the bath water. 
Rorty employs the familiar analogy between demons 
and sensations at this point to show how the disappearance 
process works. Of course, demons and caloric fluid can 
never be proven not to exist. Non-existence iB by defi-
nition not a discoverable thing. But "caloric fluid" is 
replaced by another concept whose referent is discovered 
to exist. And if it so happens that this new concept is 
sufficient to explain all that the old concept could ex-
plain! and if the new concept serves us better than the 
oldi then it is not merely the terms "caloric fluid" which 
disappear, but the ontological status as well. With re-
gard to demons Rörty sayst "...the simplicity of the ac-
counts which can be offered if we forget about demons is 
an excellent reason for saying that there are no demons."3 
Likewise, the principle of simplicity would allow for the 
elimination of the ontological status of sensations if and 
when brain talk sufficiently replaces mental talk or dual-
istic talk. 
22 
Obviously, Rorty's task is not to advance brain-talk 
to that U t o p i a n stage, but to show the feasibility of such 
advancement. And showing feasibility amounts to no more 
than displaying the ways in which brain-talk is adequate in 
describing and predicting mental phenomena. Inline with 
the simplicity principle, Rorty says we can eliminate "the 
referring use of the expression in question ('demon,' 'sen-
sation') from our language [ i f doing so] would leave our 
ability t o describe and predict undiminished. 
But, would such an elimination leave our ability to 
describe and predict undiminished? On the surface it seems 
not. However, Rorty offers two elucidations • in order t o 
render an affirmative answer to this question more pala-
table. First, "ability" t o describe and predict tnean3 
logical possibility not mere physical convenience. Cer-
tainly i t would be impractical to eliminate sensation-tulk 
from our vocabulary, just as it would be impractical to 
substitute "molecule-clouds" f o r "tables." But logically 
speaking, i t could be done, and this is all that matters. 
Second, our natural repugnance at the statement, "There 
are no such things aQ sensations," stems not from the 
indubitability of the sensations themselves but from habit. 
That is, v/e are in the habit of positing the existence of 
non-inferentially experienced phenomena such as sensations, 
whereas, we are not in the same habit with respect to in-
ferred entities such as demons or caloric fluid. Habit, 
however, has little or nothing to do with ontology. Con-
sequently, Rorty claims, even though it might seem odd to 
eliminate sensations, the fact that it is possible to do 
just that makes sensations a proper candidate for the sim-
plicity criterion. Therefore, since a materialistic ex-
planation is as adequate as, and simpler than, a dualiotic 
one, parsimony urges us to adopt a materialistic identity 
theory. 
II. How Rorty's Eliminativo Materialism Contains a 
Deceptive Shift of Emphasis. 
My basic criticism of Rorty'o materialism is that 
his particular brand o f "identity" is not amenable to an 
application o f the simplicity principle. On the one hand 
Rorty seems to want t o replace sensation terms by brain-
state terms which would then carry a double role. On the 
o t h e r , he seems to want to l e t the ontological status of 
the sensation-talk referents wither away because the brain-
state terms (now viewed as single-tracked) have success-
fully replaced the sensation terms--forgetting that it was 
only by this stipulation that the replacement was effected 
to begin with. If thiB is indeed what Rorty has done then 
i t is clear that the simplicity criterion cannot apply 
here f o r the f o l l o w i n g reason. Either the descriptive 
role o f b r a i n-talk is insufficient t o encompass the de-
^»cHp^ t^e^oJ^ ^ ) f^5^^ is sufficient only 
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because brain-talk surreptitiously retains a dualistic 
ontology within a deceptive single-tracked language. 
The last sentence of the preceding paragraph states 
in a nutshell a crucial criticism of Rorty*s position and 
accordingly it must be expanded and clarified. The point 
being made is that the simplicity criterion fails to apply 
because brain-talk is inadequate to describe what sensation-
talk describes. Richard Bernstein argues that it is only 
in a restricted "scientific sense" that the description 
requisite is fulfilled.5 He Bays, 
The issue is not whether or not I can describe the 
same thing or event in neurophysiological dis-
course, but whether I can give the same types of 
descriptions and reports that I now give of my 
sensations and feelings in the new purified neu-
rophysiological science. If I can't then there 
is a perfectly legitimate sense in which I can say 
that although for scientific purposes my ability 
to describe and predict is undiminished, never-
theless my ability to describe is diminished if I 
adopt the new neurophysiological discourse. Why? 
Because there would be no way of saying in this 
ideal language what I can now correctly say. 
Rorty would counter that one can simply replace men-
tal terms with brain-state terms. "It would make life 
simpler for us if you would, in the future, say 'My C-
fibers are firing' instead of saying 'I'm in pain.'"6 We 
could, merely by convention (if our scientific knowledge 
were up to it), simply agree to eliminate further use of 
mental language, and, in its place, issue the appropriate 
neurophysiological statements. Thus, by merely readapting 
bruin-talk, the mental descriptive role could be incorpor-
ated and Bernstein's objection would be answered. Thus, 
synonymity would answer Bernstein's objection. There are 
two obvious responses which can be made about Rorty's 
simple substitution-of-terms hypothesis. First, there 
is little in this doctrine to take exception with. We 
may as well refer to different sensations by their French 
names as by neurophysiological names or mental names. 
Names are only words and, apart from their meanings, words 
are only noises or scratches. Second, if this is all that 
Rorty's program is based on then it is. shallow and unin-
teresting. 
The first response serves to give Rorty's eliminative 
materialism hypothesis an air of plausibility. If all 
Rorty's program does is to switch vocabularies, only the 
obstinate would refuse to go along. The second response 
represents a criticism which Rorty attempts to sidestep 
by shifting emphasis. His new emphasis is away from the 
mere substitutions of vocabularies, and towards the 
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materialistic referents of neurophysiological terms. If 
this is the case, then, in Rorty'a disappearance theory, 
mental terms have indeed disappeared—by replacement} 
their referents, howeveri have disappeared by fancy foot-
wo rk alone• 
Let us look more closely at the main contention 
that the criticism espouses. Rorty has eliminated "sen-
sation" but not sensations themselves. Consider the two 
statementsi 
(A) My pain is agonizing. 
(B) My C-fibers are firing rapidly 
If we choose to comply with Rorty*s vocabulary replace-
ment, we may, in the future, use 'B* whenever we want to 
express the meanings of either 'A' or 'B'. But in so 
doing, we must keep in mind that the reporting function 
of 'A' is tacitly present in 'B'. Nothing has been elim-
inated at this stage except the scratches or the verbal 
noises "My pain 1B agonizing." Of course, to opt for 'B' 
expressions exclusively would be to adopt a language which 
says much more than 'A* expressions alone can say. *B' 
expressions would then serve an explanatory role which 'A' 
statements presently do not. 'B* statements would refer 
to the causes or correlations previously associated with 
the now defunct 'A* statements. 
Of course, to eliminate the 'A* statement is not 
necessarily to eliminate the 'A' function. If we choose 
to say 'B1 at all—we may be saying 'Bi'. 'Bi* is more 
than 'B', it is the 'B* statement plus the *A* function. 
Opting for 'Bi' statements would then express these two 
different ideast 
(1) The cause or correlation of a pain is nothing 
more than a brain-state, (explanatory role) 
(2) The agony associated with the pain (which used 
to be expressed by sensation-talk) 1B now implicitly ex-
pressed by 'Bi'-talk. (reportive role) 
It would be possible to teach a child to say "abar-
acadabara" upon touching a hot stovei but then "abaraca-
dabara" would still serve the same function as "ouch, 
stove hot." Likewise, "my heat sensitive C-fibers are 
firing rapidly" would serve to express the same function 
as "ouch, stove hot." But, of course, it would do more. 
It v/ould referentially locate the neural states associated 
with the sensation. (However, "association with" is not 
necessarily synonymous with "cause of"} it may simply mean 
"correlation with"—a possibility which no one denies.) 
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Mow such bräin-state talk is certainly economical 
since it serves two functions with one statement, out 
this economy of language should not be confused with sim-
plicity of ontology. Perhaps it would be wise for us to 
opt for this brain talk—unless, of course, it could be 
shown that it would be too impractical (i.e., too physi-
cally complicated) and provided the attractive simplicity 
of brain-talk doesn't deceive us. Rorty admits that 
dropping sensation language in favor of brain-state talk 
is, in fact, too impractical and inconvenient.7 But this 
only says that it will not be done, not that it can not. 
So what will concern us here is the deception factor in-
herent in Rorty's program. 
"The pain I am experiencing is my C-fibers firing" 
is quite an acceptable response from a person whom we be-
lieve to be in pain as long as we keep in mind the two 
separate functions which the new statement implies. But--
and this is where the deception enters—the tendency is 
to translate the statement as "The pain I am experiencing 
is nothing but my C-fibers firing." Indeed this is the 
interpretation which Rorty desires, thus eliminating the 
sensation, the pain. The 'nothing but' serves to omit the 
second'function of brain-talk (i.e., the reportive role). 
By eliminating sensations rather than just sensation-talk 
we have done much more than when we eliminated demon talk 
in favor of germ talk. It is possible that we have lost, 
an essential function on the one hand, and a mere ad, hoc. 
hypothetical entity on the other. 
The dilemma we are confronted with is this, either 
brain-state-talk does fulfill the descriptive function or 
it doesn't. If it doesn't (because neglecting the repor-
tive role) then it is not adequate to account for the same 
kinds of things that dualistic talk can account for. For 
instance, it would fail to describe the common pain adjec-
tives such as intense, throbbing, etc., as our present 
sensation language is readily able to do. If it does ful-
fill the descriptive function then it can only do so by 
virtue of the fact that it is a two-seated language and is 
implicitly committed to a dualism—of functions at least. 
That is, it does two essentially different things* it ex-
plains, by referring to neurophysiological movements, and 
it describes sensations in the exact same way that sensa-
tion talk "used to" describe sensations. Thus, if brain-
state-talk does fulfill the descriptive function, then it 
is as much a two way street as dualistic talk, and it is 
no less committed to a mind/body dualism. 
Rorty'B reply to similar criticism has been that his 
critics are begging the question. They are assuming the 
existence of mental entities, and faulting the new, neuro-
physical language for failing to describe these entities 
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as the old, dualistic language did. But, since it is just 
the existence of these assumed entities which iB being 
questioned, the critic's argument is clearly circular. 
However, my point is that Rorty is faced with a dilemmat 
either the new language does embrace the ontological com-
mittment of dualistic talk, or it does not. If it does, 
then the plan fails (i.e., since it would be surrepti-
tiously double-tracked). If it does not, then the new 
talk fails to describe what dualistic talk describes (no 
matter what that is), and is not, therefore, amenable to 
the simplicity criterion. 
The eliminative materialist may attempt to escape 
between the horns of this dilemma by arguing that the new 
language will prove to be descriptively adequate since it 
only fails to describe what is really non-existent in the 
first place, viz. sensations. However, this ploy would 
beg the question. The non-existence of sensations cannot 
be used to support the feasibility of adopting the new 
language, since it is the adoption of the new language 
which I s originally offered as support for the non-existence 
of sensations. 
It is true that when we eliminate demons on the basis 
of eliminability of demon talk we are merely getting rid 
of excess baggage. But if we try the same thing with sen-
sations and sensation-talk we shall have found that we 
have lost some necessary baggage. So this was Rorty's 
treki he chose (for economical reasons) to use brain-talk 
for both neural references and the descriptive function 
of mental terms. Brain-talk, that is, was given a stipu-
lative two way function. But later, under the guise of 
the simplicity principle, he actually eliminated one of 
the functions of his new comprehensive language—and he 
is the poorer for it. 
Germ talk (in his demon analogy) isn't such a two 
way street as is brain-talk. It doesn't serve the double 
function of explaining, say, the appearance of the demons 
to the medicine man, while also explaining the causes for 
the sickness. Therefore, the only way we could accomplish 
the analogous elimination of sensations by way of adopting 
brain-talk is if we first discovered that there was in 
fact nothing to which sensation-talk referred. Eut, of 
course, that would be begging the question. 
It is not the simplicity principle which is being 
Implemented by Rorty here, but an attempt to sidestep the 
prerequisites upon which the principle is predicated. By 
quickly shifting from questions based on the reportive 
role functions, to answers from the explanatory role, the 
eliminative materialist eliminates too much. Rorty cor-
rectly points to those descriptive adjectives such as 
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"intense," "sharp," and "throbbing" which characterize the 
sensation function, but fail to make sense when applied to 
brain-talk. But his explanation of this pesky fact is in-
sufficient. He says "If referring expressions can go out 
of. date, why not adjectives as well?"0" The answer is that 
they can, but only if we stipulate that the function of 
such ajectives becomes synonymous with the new brain-talk 
expressions. That is, only I f we mean by "My heat sensing 
C-fibers are firing at approximately such and such a rate" 
exactly the same (and more perhaps) as "my burned finger 
is throbbing with pain." But if we do so stipulate, it 
would hardly be cricket to reverse positions later on and 
to attempt to eliminate the function with which our new 
brain-talk was held to be partially synonymous in the first 
place. 
Rorty's approach fails because it attempts the im-
possible t it tries to say in one language framework some-
thing about the hidden conditions of another, inaccessible 
framework. He asks us to use everyday English to hyposta-
tize about the ontology inherent in an alien language—one 
whose vocabulary contains terms which resemble our present 
neurophysiological terms, but which fail to carry the same 
denotations as them. We can only reply quite as would the 
witchdoctor upon first being told about germs, "Oh, what 
you mean by germ talk (brain-talk) is just the same as 
what I mean by demon talk (dualistic talk)." The only 
reason for the witchdoctor's eventual capitulation is that 
there are those who reside in that "inaccessible" region, 
there are those who have seen the germs through micro-
scopes. For the analogy to work there would have to be 
those in the inaccessible land of non-dualistic talk, 
those who have seen the inadequacy of our ontology and 
who envision a better way. It is only when you have seen 
the germs that demon talk seems primitive. Consequently, 
the strongest claim that EM can make is that it might be 
possible to have a non-dualistic language and that, there-
fore, materialism is at least vaguely plausible. This 
diluted conclusion is too weak to warrant any philosophi-
cal interest. 
University of Kansas 
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